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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16777

SALVADOR P. TOSCANO, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
At the outset, it must be clear that while this
case concerns information given by Appellant, it does not
concern an affirmative misrepresentation, as Respondent
implies.

Instead the crucial issues center on the meaning

of the word "occupy" and comprise widespread public policy
ramifications concerning the State's treatment of migrant
workers and the application of equitable estoppel when the
State's conduct is less than scrupulous.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE BECAUSE HE OWNED EXEMPT PROPERTY
IN MULESHOE, TEXAS.
The regulation that is the basis for this controversy
is found at Utah's Vol. II Assistance Payments Manual §410.1,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pertaining

~o

exempt assets.

That regulation allows the

exemption of one "home and lot owned or being purchased and
occupied by the applicant ..•. "

However, if the applicant's

home does not fit that requirement, it will be considered a
resource in evaluating his need for financial assistance.
Appellant has offered many ways to assist the
Court in interpreting whether Appellant has indeed satisfied
the requirement.

In the endeavor to shed some light on the

meaning of this previously undefined, but crucial word
"occupy," Appellant offered the guidance used in a similar
program of public assistance, that of food stamp assistance.
Contrary to Respondent's allegation that Appellant has
attempted to confuse the Court by offering the regulations
governing food stamp eligibility, Brief of Respondent at 4,
Appellant merely suggests that some guidance might be had by
ref erring to regulations that have been tested by similar
situations as those presented by the instant case.
It is important to note that food stamp assistance
is not governed exclusively by regulations of the United
States Department of Agriculture and that cash assistance is
not governed exclusively by regulations of the United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and
Human Services).

See Brief of Respondent at 5.

are governed by more specific State regulations.

Both programs
The State

is free to interpret the definition of an exempt home for
financial assistance in the same way as for food stamp
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assistance.

45 C.F.R. §233.20(a) (3)

(1975].

Presented with

the situation of migrant workers whose homes are located in
other states, the State promulgated Vol. IV Assistance
Payments Manual §§304.21 and 680.3 (presently 680.5).

The

effect of these provisions is to allow a migrant worker to
own a home in another state and consider it an exempt resource.
The sense of this is obvious:

a person should not be denied

the assistance he so gravely needs because he maintains a
home for his family, but because of his work skills and
economic status is forced to travel interstate to find
employment.

When his situation. allows, he returns to the

house that only he and his family occupy.

In interpreting

the regulations otherwise, the State has no qualms about
giving a person who resides in a house financial assistance,
but because a person is forced by his occupation to live in
various tents and shacks, the State will deny him assistance.
Therefore, since the State in its food stamp
program, whose goals are similar to the financial assistance
program, has considered the equities and public policy
considerations of a migrant's living situation, reference to
the regulations that address this specific situation should
suggest the approach to be taken in this case.
To further assist the Court in determining the
occupancy requirement, Appellant cited past cases that have
passed upon the meaning of "occupy."
5-7.

Appellant's Brief at

Respondent gives only a cursory answer to those cases,

simply categorizing them as "insurance cases" and does not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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even attempt to respond to Macomber v. State Social Welfare
Board, 175 Cal.App.2d 614, 346 P.2d 808 (Ct.App. 1968),
which faced a similar issue in the public assistance context.
Instead, Respondent attempts to refute the case law interpretations
of "occupy" by reciting Respondent's counsel's life history.
Counsel's educational and travel background hardly seems
appropriate in the present context.

By his recitation of

personal history, counsel for Respondent clearly shows his
failure to comprehend the basic nature of this case.
edu~ational

travel for

His

purposes and the duration of his

absence were by choice.

Appellant, on the other hand, had

to travel and be absent from his home in order to pursue a
livelihood.

Further, counsel's life story evidences an

intent to remain in Utah.

He reveals nothing to indicate

that he still considered his parent's house the home he then
occupied.
Respondent also emphasizes that Appellant was in
Utah from the period of December, 1975, to June, 1976.
Brief of Respondent at 10.

However, Respondent fails to

note that Appellant's injury severely limited his mobility,
hindering his ability to travel back home to Texas.

Appellant

felt further compelled to remain in Utah to make sure that
liability for medical expenses was resolved.
Supplemental Record.

Tr. at 95,

To twist Appellant's physical pain and

extreme honesty to look like he stayed in Utah only to
collect his financial assistance is particularly insidious.

-4-
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Taken overall, case law and other similar public
assistance programs, like food stamps, have interpreted
"occupy" in a way that only supports Appellant.
the equities favor Appellant:

Most importantly,

to allow the State recovery

is to punish a man because he must travel to make a living.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT FAULT IN SUPPLYING THE
INFORMATION ON HIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
APPLICATION AND SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE
THEREFOR.
In order to accurately complete any sort of application, one must be able to understand what questions are
being asked.

It is clear from the record that Appellant did

not understand the questions on his application for financial
assistance.

This resulted from the absence of a person

reasonably fluent in Spanish to assist Appellant at the time
he was filling out the application.

The caseworker who

assisted Appellant was Lloyd Laws, an employee of the Assistance
Payments office.
not speak Spanish.

As the record demonstrates, Mr. Laws does
R. at 113-14, Tr. at 22-23.

Nor could

_Respondent prove that any Spanish-speaking individual was
present while Appellant applied for aid.

R. at 126, Tr. at

35.
Respondent seeks to rebut this by suggesting the
possibility that the Assistance Payments off ice employed at
least one person who spoke Spanish at the time Appellant
applied for assistance.

Then Respondent makes the illogical

leap that if Appellant applied at the Assistance Payments
office, he would have had assistance from an interpreter.
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This argument exhibits several fallacies.
reveals only that someone spoke Spanish.

First, the testimony
There is nothing

in the record to indicate that anyone was fluent.

To say in

such general terms that someone "speaks" Spanish may mean
someone is fluent, or it may mean someone knows enough
Spanish words to order from a menu in Spanish.

Second, and

most important, even assuming a person fluent in Spanish was
employed by the Assistance Payments office, there is absolutely
no indication that this person assisted Appellant.

The

office could have many employees fluent in Spanish, but they
are of no avail if they are not present during an applicant's
application procedure.
Further, Respondent wonders whether Appellant
applied at the Migrant Council's office or the Assistance
Payments office.

Brief, supra at 12.

The Migrant Council

off ice had not yet even been opened at the time of application
in 1975.

R. at 150, Tr. at 59.

Respondent's assertions as

to assistance by an interpreter do not have much credence,
when they are not even sure where the application was filled
out.
To further attempt to show that Appellant had the
assistance of someone fluent in Spanish, Respondent cites
the fact that Millie Rodriguez Valencia notarized the financial
assistance application.

Brief, supra at 13.

Obviously,

there is a difference between notarizing and interpreting.
In fact, the record reveals that Mrs. Valencia testified she
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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did not assist Appellant in filling out the application.
at 145, Tr. at 54.

R.

The extent of her contact was merely to

notarize the application.
Respondent has used this fallacious assumption
that an interpreter was available to assist Appellant to try
to prove Appellant was at fault.

Brief, supra.

As stated

before, the record does not reveal that an interpreter was
made available to Appellant.

Again even if an interpreter

was available, nothing suggests that an interpreter assisted
Appellant.

Yet even if Respondent's allegation was true, it

still does not prove Appellant was the one at fault.
Even if Appellant admitted all that Respondent
alleges in his Point II, there still remains the question of
how Appellant interpreted the meaning of "occupy" as used in
Vol. II §410.1.

If, for instance, Appellant was asked by an

interpreter whether he owned a home that he did not occupy,
Appellant would have understood "occupy" to mean having a
residence that he occupies by returning to it at the end of
the picking season.
In summary, Respondent has failed to prove that
Appellant had anyone fluent in Spanish help him accurately
complete the application for financial assistance.

Further,

Respondent has not proved that Appellant was at fault in any
way in filling out the application.

POINT III
APPELLANT HAS NOT RAISED ANY ARGUMENT THAT
WAS NOT PUT IN ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURT.
-7-
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In Appellant's Brief at 14-15 the elements for
equitable estoppel were listed.

Those four criteria were:

(1) whether the State's Assistance Payments office could
have been aware of the relevant facts through reasonable
diligence, as Appellant supplied all information that the
State requested;

(2) whether the Assistance Payments office

should reasonably have expected Appellant to rely on its
determination of his eligibility;

(3) whether Appellant

acted in good faith, unaware of a possible administrative
error; and (4) whether Appellant, due to his reliance on the
State's determination of his eligibility, will be injured by
a recoupment of the alleged overpayment.
In applying estoppel against the State, this Court
in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d
689, 694 (Utah 1979), listed five criteria for equitable
estoppel that are even less demanding than those set out in
Appellant's Brief:

(1) An "act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted." Obviously in this case,
this is satisfied by the recoupment of funds
after the State determined Appellant eligible
for assistance.
(2) Reliance by the other party on such act.
Again it is obvious that Appellant has relied
on the State by accepting the assistance.
(3) Injury resulting from the contradiction or
repudiation of such act. A recoupment of the
funds will gravely injure Appellant, since
the funds were paid for basic necessities,
and requiring repayment will deprive Appellant
of his ongoing necessary living expenses.
(4) "Manifest injustice." If equitable estoppel
is not applied against the State, Appellant
will be punished for his migrant status and
the State's failure to provide a competent
interpreter.
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(5) Lastly, not impairing the "exercise of
governmental powers." Although discussed
more extensively later in this Brief, suffice
it to say that allowing Appellant to retain
$2,921.00 will not impair the exercise of
governmental powers; it should even be an
incentive to the State to prevent more erroneous
payments by providing competent interpreters.
A perusal of the transcript reveals that these elements
comprising estoppel were put in issue in the lower court.
Additionally, while careful perusal of the transcript
reveals that the elements

as to violations of Appellant's

Due Process and Equal Protection rights are implicit in all that
was presented below,

important constitutional issues

should be dealt with no matter when they are raised.

This

Court in In re State in Interest of Woodward, 14 Utah 2d
336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963), found that in case of doubt as to
resolving constitutional issues raised for the first time on
appeal, the Court would resolve in favor of considering
constitutional questions.

Utah is not alone in this view.

The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, in Ruth v. Industrial_
Commission, 107 Ariz. 572, 490 P.2d 828 (1971), held that
notwithstanding the general rule that questions not raised
in the lower court will not be considered on appeal, questions
of constitutionality that would impact with statewide significance,
such as on Workmen's Compensation, should be considered.
See also Norcor of America v. Southern Arizona Intern. Livestock
Ass'n, 122 Ariz. 542, 596 P.2d 377 (1979).

Clearly denying

Spanish-speaking persons the opportunity to present their
case for financial assistance has an impact on the migrant
-9-
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population, who every year enters the state to be employed
by Utah's agricultural economy, of such statewide significance
as to be considered, even if the Court finds the constitutional
questions not to have been raised in the lower court.
POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
Respondent seeks to attack this point in three
ways.

(1)

Estoppel will not lie unless Appellant is completely

without fault;

(2) estoppels against the public are seldom

allowed; and (3) estoppel will not lie based on only an
innocent mistake.
In asserting that the estopping

par~y

must be

completely without fault, Respondent has made two mistakes.
First, Respondent asserts that it has been proven Appellant
was not without fault.

As has been demonstrated, Respondent

has not proved any fault on Appellant's part.

Indeed,

Respondent has not even successfully proved that Appellant
made a mistake in claiming the Muleshoe property to be
exempt.

Second, Respondent relies on cases that do not

stand for the position asserted:

to invoke estoppel the

party asserting it must be "completely without fault."
Brief, supra at 18.

On the contrary, in Newton v. Hornblower, Ins

224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978), corporate directors were
denied the use of estoppel in a stockholder's derivative
action because they failed to show good faith and fairness
in regard to certain transactions.

The court held: "Equitable
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estoppel is founded upon principles of morality and fair
dealing and is available only for the protection of claims
made in good faith.

11

582 P.2d at 1144.

Nowhere is it said

that the estopping party must be completely without fault.
Instead the emphasis is upon good faith and fairness.
Appellant's honesty, sincerity, and good faith have never
been questioned.

Additionally, fairness lies on the side

of the Appellant.

See Appellant's Brief at 10-14.

Respondent

also cites Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695
(Utah 1976) , for the "completely without fault" proposition.
Nowhere in that case may that proposition be found.

Rather

that case emphasizes an obligation on the part of one party
where there is a possibility of inducing reliance on the
part of the other.
Next, Respondent states that according to Corpus
Juris Secundum, estoppels against the public are not corrunon.
Brief of Respondent at 13.

We are not concerned here with

the popularity of various forms of relief, but with the
appropriateness of relief.

The C.J.S. quotation that Respondent

relies on states that estoppel will not be allowed if it
defeats public policy or the interests of justice.

It has

been shown that such public policy factors as encouraging
those recipients who have been overpaid to come forward with
that error and preventing further administrative errors
would be promoted by granting estoppel.
of justice lie on the side of Appellant.

-11-

Also, the interests
To recover financial
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assistance from Appellant is to punish him for having to
live a transient lifestyle in order to be employed, rather
than living in his house year-round.

Additionally, the

courts have increasingly endorsed equitable estoppel against
the government, Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control Commission,
supra; Hoeber v. District of Columbia Redev. Land, 483
F.Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1980).
Respondent's third point is that an innocent
mistake does not justify estoppel.

Whereas that may be very

true, Respondent must take blame for more than an innocent
mistake.

In hiving no bilingual staff to assist migrants,

Respondent has made more than an innocent mistake.

Because

it is inevitable in Utah that some Spanish-speaking people
will at times find themselves in need of public assistance,
it falls within the realm of culpable negligence to not
adequately provide for competent interpreters.

In fact,

this is the sort of culpable negligence this Court had in
mind in Morgan, supra, 549 P.2d at 697, upon which Respondent
again relies.

Brief of Respondent at 19.

In Celebrity Club, supra at 694-95, this Court had
occasion to further elaborate upon the criteria for estoppel
from Morgan, supra.

Applying those criteria to a claim for

estoppel against the government, the Court found language
from State v. Sponburgh, 66 Wash.2d 135, 401 P.2d 635, 640
(1965), "particularly appropriate":
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is properly applicable in a case such as this, otherwise
the whim of an administrative body could bankrupt
an applicant who acted in good faith in reliance
uponLawa Library.
solemn
written
commitment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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The conduct of government should always be
scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens;
and where a public official, acting within his
authority and with knowledge of the pertinent
facts, has made a commitment and the party to whom
it was made has acted to his detriment in
reliance on that commitment, the official should
not be permitted to revoke that commitment.
In the present case, Appellant followed the application
procedures to the best of his understanding as they were
explained to him at Respondent's office.

Appellant then

relied upon Respondent's determination of his eligibility.
Thus Respondent has failed entirely in rebuttal to
Appellant's claim of equitable estoppel.
POINT V
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION AND
DUE PROCESS WERE INFRINGED UPON IN APPELLANT's
INTERVIEW FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.
Respondent attacks Appellant's claim to violation
of his constitutional rights in only one way:

by asserting

that the interview was in fact conducted in Spanish.

Throughout

this case it has been conclusively shown that Appellant did
not have a fluent Spanish interpreter to assist in the
application procedure.

Specifically, even if the Assistance

Payments office had an interpreter, it has not been shown
that the interpreter was competent.

And even if there was a

competent interpreter, it has not been proven that the
interpreter assisted Appellant.

For Respondent to say, "It

is conceivable that Millie Valencia assisted the Appellant
in completing his financial assistance form," Brief, supra
at 21, is directly contrary to her testimony.

-13-

R. at 145,
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Tr. at 54.

For Respondent to point to the writing of "torn

cartilage, left knee" on Appellant's application as indicating
the aid of an interpreter, Brief, supra at 22, is to deny
the very likely possibility that this information was obtained
from a doctor's report.
Respondent has conceded all the other arguments
Appellant raised in relation to his constitutional claims.
Respondent has based his argument on the invalid presumption
that Appellant had a competent Spanish interpreter to assist
him.

Since that has been shown to be without adequate

proof, Respondent is left with no rebuttal to the constitutional
violations.
CONCLUSION
However, this Court need not deal with the constitutional, equitable, or policy issues, if the Court simply
finds that under the proper interpretation of the regulation
in question, a man who owns his home and has travelled away
from it, intending to return to it and without occupying any
other home, "occupies" that home, so as to

~e

equally entitled

to assistance as a homeowner who is not compelled to seek a
living on an itinerant basis.
On this basis, the Court should reverse Appellant's
liability for incorrect assistance assessed by the lower
court and remand to the Department of Social Services for a
determination of Appellant's eligibility for assistance
under the correct interpretation of the regulation, during
the period in question, and after termination of benefits
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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upon discovery of the "error."

If, on the other hand, the

Court determines Appellant was not eligible under the correct
interpretation of the regulation, but that it is inequitable
for the State to hold him liable for erroneous payments when
he was unassisted in understanding the eligibility requirements,
then the Court should still reverse Appellant's liability,
but he cannot claim further eligibility for benefits.
DATED this

~~

day of November, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

f__vvM!)

ib1t //~g;;

By Lucy Billings
352 South Denver Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
328-8891
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage
prepaid, to Stephen G. Schwendiman, Esq., Assistant Attorney
General, 150 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103,
this

Ji.!_

day of November, 1980.
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